(03-20-2019 11:30 AM)Hambone10 Wrote: Wait... This case isn't about the right to counsel.
It's about the right to waive an appeal in order to avoid the death penalty... and then to appeal anyway.
ALmost any plea deal waives you're right to a trial by jury... something specifically afforded in our laws. Why should this be different?
Correct, the case itself has nothing at all to do with the right to counsel, but it doesn't have anything to do with what you are talking about either.
Petitioner Gilberto Garza, Jr., signed two plea agreements, each arising
from state criminal charges and each containing a clause stating that
Garza waived his right to appeal. Shortly after sentencing, Garza
told his trial counsel that he wished to appeal. Instead of filing a notice of appeal, counsel informed Garza that an appeal would be “problematic” given Garza’s appeal waiver. After the time period for Garza to preserve an appeal lapsed, he sought state postconviction relief,
alleging that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by
failing to file a notice of appeal despite his repeated requests. The
Idaho trial court denied relief, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed. Also affirming, the Idaho Supreme Court held that Garza
could not show the requisite deficient performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. In doing so, the court concluded that the presumption of prejudice recognized in Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S. 470,
when trial counsel fails to file an appeal as instructed does not apply
when the defendant has agreed to an appeal waiver.
Basically, Garza agreed to a plea, then decided he wanted to appeal something. His lawyer ignored his client's wishes and he then filed for post-conviction relief for ineffective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court ruled in his favor, which by the way only means he can file the original appeal he wanted to file in the first place (that his lawyer probably wasn't wrong that he will lose). You are right though this entire case has nothing to do with the right to counsel, yet the 3rd section of Thomas' dissent is all about the 6th amendment and the right to counsel.
In addition to breaking from this Court’s precedent,
today’s decision moves the Court another step further
from the original meaning of the Sixth Amendment. The
Sixth Amendment provides that, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense.” That provision “as
originally understood and ratified meant only that a defendant had a right to employ counsel, or to use volunteered services of counsel.” Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U. S.
356, 389 (2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Yet, the Court has
read the Constitution to require not only a right to counsel
at taxpayers’ expense, but a right to effective counsel. The
result is that convicted criminals can relitigate their trial
and appellate claims through collateral challenges
couched as ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Because little available evidence suggests that this reading is
correct as an original matter, the Court should tread
carefully before extending our precedents in this area.
The point to why he put all this really unrelated nonsense in is that it allows judges to be able to cite this later for some nonsense decision, a la what he just did citing a dissent from Scalia in 2010 describing what his opinion of the originally understood version of the 6th amendment is. He's trying to create precedent out of thin air that doesn't exist.
/
Clarence Thomas questions Gideon v. Wainwright
