I'm searching for oil subsidizes and this particular website is blocked at my school. The CATO institute may have an interesting take on it. Could someone copy and paste this article.

http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/how-large...-subsidies




So far I have been able to find that oil companies enjoy an corporate tax rate of 11%.

A multitude of federal corporate income tax credits and deductions results in an effective income tax rate of 11% for the oil industry, compared to the non-oil industry average of 18%. If the oil industry paid the industrywide average tax rate (including oil) of 17%, they would have paid an additional $2.0 billion in 1991.
http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_vehicles/veh...g-oil.html



My argument is we have no idea where place "B" is because it's so easy to stay at place "A" with all of the subsidizes.

"Quantifying the national security costs associated with ensuring the safe and reliable delivery of foreign oil is difficult. The Congressional Research Service estimated in 1997 that those costs may be anywhere between $0.5-65 billion, or 1.5 cents to 30 cents per gallon for motor fuel from the Persian Gulf."


...your argument for wanting to increase it by 2 dollars was just shot out of the water.

So now you are begging for a copy paste

The military expenditure to keep shipping lanes open should reasonably be paid by other countries.

How Large are Federal Oil Subsidies?

Posted by Jerry Taylor

Yesterday, I co-authored an op-ed with Peter Van Doren on the Democrats' energy bill scheduled for a vote today in the House. The bill is advertised as an exercise to eliminate the subsidies going to "Big Oil" and to use that money instead to subsidize renewable energy (the fact that "Big Oil" is also in the renewable energy business and will simply find that the federal checks are going to different corporate in-boxes has apparently not occurred to anyone, but I digress). But did the Democrats wipe out all the subsidies, or did they leave some big subsidies behind?

A lot of people think that the Democrats left a lot of money on the table. Today in the Christian Science Monitor, for example, economist Doug Koplow argues that the biggest subsidy left untouched by Pelosi & Co. relates to the military protection of oil producing facilities and shipping lanes abroad, a mission which costs the taxpayer at least $19 billion a year.

While the Ds certainly were less than thorough in their anti-oil-subsidy crusade, I'm not so sure that the subsidies are anywhere near as large as many people think.

Quantifying the national security costs associated with ensuring the safe and reliable delivery of foreign oil is difficult. The Congressional Research Service estimated in 1997 that those costs may be anywhere between $0.5-65 billion, or 1.5 cents to 30 cents per gallon for motor fuel from the Persian Gulf. Agreement about the extent of the military’s “oil mission” is difficult because military and foreign policy expenditures are generally tasked with multiple missions and objectives, and oil security is simply one mission of many. Analysts disagree about how to divide those missions into budgetary terms.

Debate about the size of the U.S. military’s oil mission and related foreign policy expenses, however, is not particularly relevant to a discussion about whether and to what extent oil companies are subsidized by this kind of thing. From an economic perspective, the key question is whether an elimination of U.S. military and foreign aid expenditures dedicated to “the oil mission” would result in (a) greater corporate expenditures to secure oil from abroad, and/or (b) an increase in the price of oil, and, if so, how much? That is the true measure of the subsidy if it indeed exists. That's because, if the oil mission provides no value to multinational oil companies or oil consumers - as I maintain - than it is not a subsidy. Measuring the subsidy by the amount of money government spends on the oil mission is at best a measure of how much politicians believe the national security externalities might be. Political assessments may or may not be accurate.

To be sure, if the termination of the American “oil mission” implied the termination of all military, police, and court services in the region, petroleum extraction investments would become more risky, extraction of oil might decrease, and prices would increase. But remember that oil companies in the Middle-East are creatures of government. So the question is really whether Middle-East governments would produce less oil because the United States ended its oil-related military mission and foreign aid. Or would oil producing states provide – or pay others to provide – military services to replace those previously provided by the United States?

I strongly suspect that a cessation of U.S. security assistance would be replaced by security expenditures from other parties. First, oil producers will provide for their own security needs as long as the cost of doing so results in greater profits than equivalent investments could yield. Because Middle-Eastern governments typically have nothing of value to trade except oil, they must secure and sell oil to remain viable. Second, given that their economies are so heavily dependent upon oil revenues, Middle-Eastern governments have even more incentive than we do to worry about the security of production facilities, ports, and sea lanes.

In short, whatever security our presence provides (and many analysts think that our presence actually reduces security) could be provided by other parties were the United States to withdraw. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait paid for 55 percent of the cost of Operation Desert Storm suggests that keeping the Straits of Hormuz free of trouble is certainly within their means. The same argument applies to Al Qaeda threats to oil production facilities.

If oil regimes paid for their own military protection and the protection of their own shipping lanes, would U.S. Middle-East military expenditures really go down? The answer might very well be “no” for two very different reasons. First, the U.S. Middle-East military presence stems from our implicit commitment to defend Israel as well as the region from Islamic fundamentalism, and those missions would not likely end simply because Arab oil regimes paid for their own economic security needs. Second, bureaucratic and congressional inertia might leave military expenditures constant regardless of Israeli or petroleum defense needs.

Thus, U.S. "oil mission" should not be viewed as a subsidy that lowers oil prices below what they otherwise would be. Instead, the expenditures are a taxpayer-financed gift to oil regimes and the Israeli government that has little, if any, effect on oil prices or corporate profits. Now, I'd be happy to see the oil mission go, but "Big Oil" won't be any poorer for it.

That is called teamwork. How about that?

I disagree with Jerry, but definetly worth the read. Thanks SUM.

Reb,

Not that thinking is a strong suit for you but look at the year. I think our costs in the Middle East may have gone up slightly since 1997.

Why is a Cato institute website blocked at a school?

ACCESS DENIED : ) HELP


Internet access to the requested website has been denied based on your user profile and organization's Internet Usage Policy.


User/Machine:
IPGROUP
IP:
Category: Web Logs/Personal Pages Blocked URL: http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/how-large...-subsidies

I think it blocks it because it's a blog. I get Drudge and Rush but not Huffington Post so I don't think it's political.

(02-11-2011 09:32 AM)SumOfAllFears Wrote:  So now you are begging for a copy paste

The military expenditure to keep shipping lanes open should reasonably be paid by other countries.

How Large are Federal Oil Subsidies?

Posted by Jerry Taylor

Yesterday, I co-authored an op-ed with Peter Van Doren on the Democrats' energy bill scheduled for a vote today in the House. The bill is advertised as an exercise to eliminate the subsidies going to "Big Oil" and to use that money instead to subsidize renewable energy (the fact that "Big Oil" is also in the renewable energy business and will simply find that the federal checks are going to different corporate in-boxes has apparently not occurred to anyone, but I digress). But did the Democrats wipe out all the subsidies, or did they leave some big subsidies behind?

A lot of people think that the Democrats left a lot of money on the table. Today in the Christian Science Monitor, for example, economist Doug Koplow argues that the biggest subsidy left untouched by Pelosi & Co. relates to the military protection of oil producing facilities and shipping lanes abroad, a mission which costs the taxpayer at least $19 billion a year.

While the Ds certainly were less than thorough in their anti-oil-subsidy crusade, I'm not so sure that the subsidies are anywhere near as large as many people think.

Quantifying the national security costs associated with ensuring the safe and reliable delivery of foreign oil is difficult. The Congressional Research Service estimated in 1997 that those costs may be anywhere between $0.5-65 billion, or 1.5 cents to 30 cents per gallon for motor fuel from the Persian Gulf. Agreement about the extent of the military’s “oil mission” is difficult because military and foreign policy expenditures are generally tasked with multiple missions and objectives, and oil security is simply one mission of many. Analysts disagree about how to divide those missions into budgetary terms.

Debate about the size of the U.S. military’s oil mission and related foreign policy expenses, however, is not particularly relevant to a discussion about whether and to what extent oil companies are subsidized by this kind of thing. From an economic perspective, the key question is whether an elimination of U.S. military and foreign aid expenditures dedicated to “the oil mission” would result in (a) greater corporate expenditures to secure oil from abroad, and/or (b) an increase in the price of oil, and, if so, how much? That is the true measure of the subsidy if it indeed exists. That's because, if the oil mission provides no value to multinational oil companies or oil consumers - as I maintain - than it is not a subsidy. Measuring the subsidy by the amount of money government spends on the oil mission is at best a measure of how much politicians believe the national security externalities might be. Political assessments may or may not be accurate.

To be sure, if the termination of the American “oil mission” implied the termination of all military, police, and court services in the region, petroleum extraction investments would become more risky, extraction of oil might decrease, and prices would increase. But remember that oil companies in the Middle-East are creatures of government. So the question is really whether Middle-East governments would produce less oil because the United States ended its oil-related military mission and foreign aid. Or would oil producing states provide – or pay others to provide – military services to replace those previously provided by the United States?

I strongly suspect that a cessation of U.S. security assistance would be replaced by security expenditures from other parties. First, oil producers will provide for their own security needs as long as the cost of doing so results in greater profits than equivalent investments could yield. Because Middle-Eastern governments typically have nothing of value to trade except oil, they must secure and sell oil to remain viable. Second, given that their economies are so heavily dependent upon oil revenues, Middle-Eastern governments have even more incentive than we do to worry about the security of production facilities, ports, and sea lanes.

In short, whatever security our presence provides (and many analysts think that our presence actually reduces security) could be provided by other parties were the United States to withdraw. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait paid for 55 percent of the cost of Operation Desert Storm suggests that keeping the Straits of Hormuz free of trouble is certainly within their means. The same argument applies to Al Qaeda threats to oil production facilities.

If oil regimes paid for their own military protection and the protection of their own shipping lanes, would U.S. Middle-East military expenditures really go down? The answer might very well be “no” for two very different reasons. First, the U.S. Middle-East military presence stems from our implicit commitment to defend Israel as well as the region from Islamic fundamentalism, and those missions would not likely end simply because Arab oil regimes paid for their own economic security needs. Second, bureaucratic and congressional inertia might leave military expenditures constant regardless of Israeli or petroleum defense needs.

Thus, U.S. "oil mission" should not be viewed as a subsidy that lowers oil prices below what they otherwise would be. Instead, the expenditures are a taxpayer-financed gift to oil regimes and the Israeli government that has little, if any, effect on oil prices or corporate profits. Now, I'd be happy to see the oil mission go, but "Big Oil" won't be any poorer for it.

We could stop protecting Saudi Arabia. Then it would fall to Al Qaeda to protect them. Al Qaeda would then be given money to purchase arms to accomplish their mission. Great.

(02-11-2011 08:53 AM)Rebel Wrote:  The Congressional Research Service estimated in 1997 that those costs may be anywhere between $0.5-65 billion, or 1.5 cents to 30 cents per gallon for motor fuel from the Persian Gulf."

Whether it's 1.5 cents or 30 cents, it should still be paid by the user. If you want to drive a hummer, fine. Just don't expect me to subsidize your poor choice.

(02-19-2011 02:21 PM)TJfan Wrote:  Whether it's 1.5 cents or 30 cents, it should still be paid by the user. If you want to drive a hummer, fine. Just don't expect me to subsidize your poor choice.

Says the guy who supports federal funds for abortion?

Interesting.

Something that people don't realize is that we get only about 24% of our imported oil from the Middle East. Most comes from places that are closer--like Canada, Mexico, Venezuela, Brazil, Nigeria, Angola. Conversely, most of the oil that does come from the Middle East goes to places that are closer to it--like China, Japan, India. That makes sense. Implications:
1. The true beneficiaries of our efforts to protect the oil supply are China, Japan, and India. They should be paying for it.
2. Our presence is far more about empire than about oil. We want to be in control, for our own imperial ambitions.

Something else that people don't realize. At this point in time, the world oil supply is limited by economic, not physical, considerations. There is almost certainly a physical limitation out there somewhere, but that is not what we are bumping up against now. We have about a 10-year supply at current production rates. We've had about a 10-year supply pretty consistently for the last 100 years, and in all likelihood probably will for the next 100 years, too. The reason is that it's not really economically feasible to develop more than about a 10-year supply. There are pretty certain reservoirs out there that make no economic sense to produce at $80-$100 per barrel, but make economic sense at $150-$200 a barrel. When the price hits those levels--and it will--those reserves will be developed and brought on stream.

Make no mistake, this is not intended to justify a Pollyanna-ish approach. We need to wean ourselves of oil, for many reasons. But it doesn't need to be a "sky is falling" situation, because the sky is not falling.