http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090917/ap_o...le_defense

comments anyone?

(09-17-2009 05:39 PM)Rick Gerlach Wrote:  http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090917/ap_o...le_defense

comments anyone?

I don't know yet if this is a good or a bad move. I don't like the idea of alienating our allies, to curry favor with Russia, but sometimes you have to choose one side or the other. I know that some stategic reasons were given, but i don't know if they are valid or just excuses for doing what they want to do. I do know that one of the reasons some people gave for voting for Obama was that he would rehabilitate our image and repair our relations with Europe, and I don't see this as helping in that regard. I wonder if he gave another speech in Germany now if he would get the same welcome.

I am concerned, but i want to hear the opinions of intelligent people on both sides.

The theory is that if we don't deploy the ABM's in Eastern Europe, then Russia will pressure Iran on their missile and nuclear weapon projects.

I don't think that it will work, since we have tried to "play nice" with Russia with some economic incentives in return for "help" with North Korea-- and that hasn't produced a thing.

Iran has said time and again that their missile aned nuke programs are not on the table, so I don't see how making these concessions to the Russians will help. The Russians can't make them give the programs up.

While Iran buys most of its reactor technology from Russia, they don’t really need it since they can enrich uranium and reprocess their fuel rods without Russian assistance.

If their reactor breaks down, big deal. Who needs nuclear energy when you are sitting on as much oil and natural gas as they are?

I wasn't in favor of putting the missiles in to begin with. But once we decided to put them in, we put some issues into play that weren't there to begin with, and I've got mixed opinions about this decision. Certainly, if nothing else, this was a horrible choice of dates to announce it. Can't imagine how they figured the timing was a good idea, unless the goal is simply to p!$$ off Poland.

I've got a couple of thoughts about how I would have played it. One would be to tell Poland and Czech Republic that if they wanted it, they had to pay for it. That's what I would have done from the beginning. We don't need to be spending more to defend Europe than Europe pays to defend Europe. My guess is that they probably would decide they had better things to spend the money on, and that would get us off the hook a bit. Of course, if they did pony up the bucks, we would have to deliver, so there is some risk here.

Second thought would be to look at it as something we are pretty much ambivalent about. If we can get a significant concession from the Russians in exchange, then it might be well worth it to pull back. Without such concessions, we are doing this unilaterally, and that is a mistake IMO. Hard to tell right now whether we really got anything from Russia or not. We shall see.

One other thought is that other than placing the call that didn't get accepted, Hillary seems to have been pretty much a no-show on this one. Does that suggest anything about her future?

Quote:A Better Missile Defense for a Safer Europe

By ROBERT M. GATES
Published: September 19, 2009

Washington

THE future of missile defense in Europe is secure. This reality is contrary to what some critics have alleged about President Obama’s proposed shift in America’s missile-defense plans on the continent — and it is important to understand how and why.

First, to be clear, there is now no strategic missile defense in Europe. In December 2006, just days after becoming secretary of defense, I recommended to President George W. Bush that the United States place 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and an advanced radar in the Czech Republic. This system was designed to identify and destroy up to about five long-range missiles potentially armed with nuclear warheads fired from the Middle East — the greatest and most likely danger being from Iran. At the time, it was the best plan based on the technology and threat assessment available.

That plan would have put the radar and interceptors in Central Europe by 2015 at the earliest. Delays in the Polish and Czech ratification process extended that schedule by at least two years. Which is to say, under the previous program, there would have been no missile-defense system able to protect against Iranian missiles until at least 2017 — and likely much later.

Last week, President Obama — on my recommendation and with the advice of his national-security team and the unanimous support of our senior military leadership — decided to discard that plan in favor of a vastly more suitable approach. In the first phase, to be completed by 2011, we will deploy proven, sea-based SM-3 interceptor missiles — weapons that are growing in capability — in the areas where we see the greatest threat to Europe.

The second phase, which will become operational around 2015, will involve putting upgraded SM-3s on the ground in Southern and Central Europe. All told, every phase of this plan will include scores of SM-3 missiles, as opposed to the old plan of just 10 ground-based interceptors. This will be a far more effective defense should an enemy fire many missiles simultaneously — the kind of attack most likely to occur as Iran continues to build and deploy numerous short- and medium-range weapons. At the same time, plans to defend virtually all of Europe and enhance the missile defense of the United States will continue on about the same schedule as the earlier plan as we build this system over time, creating an increasingly greater zone of protection.

Steady technological advances in our missile defense program — from kill vehicles to the abilities to network radars and sensors — give us confidence in this plan. The SM-3 has had eight successful tests since 2007, and we will continue to develop it to give it the capacity to intercept long-range missiles like ICBMs. It is now more than able to deal with the threat from multiple short- and medium-range missiles — a very real threat to our allies and some 80,000 American troops based in Europe that was not addressed by the previous plan. Even so, our military will continue research and development on a two-stage ground-based interceptor, the kind that was planned to be put in Poland, as a back-up.

Moreover, a fixed radar site like the one previously envisioned for the Czech Republic would be far less adaptable than the airborne, space- and ground-based sensors we now plan to use. These systems provide much more accurate data, offer more early warning and tracking options, and have stronger networking capacity — a key factor in any system that relies on partner countries. This system can also better use radars that are already operating across the globe, like updated cold war-era installations, our newer arrays based on high-powered X-band radar, allied systems and possibly even Russian radars.

One criticism of this plan is that we are relying too much on new intelligence holding that Iran is focusing more on short- and medium-range weapons and not progressing on intercontinental missiles. Having spent most of my career at the C.I.A., I am all too familiar with the pitfalls of over-reliance on intelligence assessments that can become outdated. As Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a few days ago, we would be surprised if the assessments did not change because “the enemy gets a vote.”

The new approach to European missile defense actually provides us with greater flexibility to adapt as new threats develop and old ones recede. For example, the new proposal provides some antimissile capacity very soon — a hedge against Iran’s managing to field missiles much earlier than had been previously predicted. The old plan offered nothing for almost a decade.

Those who say we are scrapping missile defense in Europe are either misinformed or misrepresenting what we are doing. This shift has even been distorted as some sort of concession to Russia, which has fiercely opposed the old plan. Russia’s attitude and possible reaction played no part in my recommendation to the president on this issue. Of course, considering Russia’s past hostility toward American missile defense in Europe, if Russia’s leaders embrace this plan, then that will be an unexpected — and welcome — change of policy on their part. But in any case the facts are clear: American missile defense on the continent will continue, and not just in Central Europe, the most likely location for future SM-3 sites, but, we hope, in other NATO countries as well.

This proposal is, simply put, a better way forward — as was recognized by Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland when he called it “a chance for strengthening Europe’s security.” It is a very real manifestation of our continued commitment to our NATO allies in Europe — iron-clad proof that the United States believes that the alliance must remain firm.

I am often characterized as “pragmatic.” I believe this is a very pragmatic proposal. I have found since taking this post that when it comes to missile defense, some hold a view bordering on theology that regards any change of plans or any cancellation of a program as abandonment or even breaking faith. I encountered this in the debate over the Defense Department’s budget for the fiscal year 2010 when I ended three programs: the airborne laser, the multiple-kill vehicle and the kinetic energy interceptor. All were plainly unworkable, prohibitively expensive and could never be practically deployed — but had nonetheless acquired a devoted following.

I have been a strong supporter of missile defense ever since President Ronald Reagan first proposed it in 1983. But I want to have real capacity as soon as possible, and to take maximum advantage of new technologies to combat future threats.

The bottom line is that there will be American missile defense in Europe to protect our troops there and our NATO allies. The new proposal provides needed capacity years earlier than the original plan, and will provide even more robust protection against longer-range threats on about the same timeline as the previous program. We are strengthening — not scrapping — missile defense in Europe.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/opinio...anted=1&hp

(09-20-2009 03:53 PM)At Ease Wrote:  

Quote:A Better Missile Defense for a Safer Europe

By ROBERT M. GATES
Published: September 19, 2009

Washington

THE future of missile defense in Europe is secure. This reality is contrary to what some critics have alleged about President Obama’s proposed shift in America’s missile-defense plans on the continent — and it is important to understand how and why.

First, to be clear, there is now no strategic missile defense in Europe. In December 2006, just days after becoming secretary of defense, I recommended to President George W. Bush that the United States place 10 ground-based interceptors in Poland and an advanced radar in the Czech Republic. This system was designed to identify and destroy up to about five long-range missiles potentially armed with nuclear warheads fired from the Middle East — the greatest and most likely danger being from Iran. At the time, it was the best plan based on the technology and threat assessment available.

That plan would have put the radar and interceptors in Central Europe by 2015 at the earliest. Delays in the Polish and Czech ratification process extended that schedule by at least two years. Which is to say, under the previous program, there would have been no missile-defense system able to protect against Iranian missiles until at least 2017 — and likely much later.

Last week, President Obama — on my recommendation and with the advice of his national-security team and the unanimous support of our senior military leadership — decided to discard that plan in favor of a vastly more suitable approach. In the first phase, to be completed by 2011, we will deploy proven, sea-based SM-3 interceptor missiles — weapons that are growing in capability — in the areas where we see the greatest threat to Europe.

The second phase, which will become operational around 2015, will involve putting upgraded SM-3s on the ground in Southern and Central Europe. All told, every phase of this plan will include scores of SM-3 missiles, as opposed to the old plan of just 10 ground-based interceptors. This will be a far more effective defense should an enemy fire many missiles simultaneously — the kind of attack most likely to occur as Iran continues to build and deploy numerous short- and medium-range weapons. At the same time, plans to defend virtually all of Europe and enhance the missile defense of the United States will continue on about the same schedule as the earlier plan as we build this system over time, creating an increasingly greater zone of protection.

Steady technological advances in our missile defense program — from kill vehicles to the abilities to network radars and sensors — give us confidence in this plan. The SM-3 has had eight successful tests since 2007, and we will continue to develop it to give it the capacity to intercept long-range missiles like ICBMs. It is now more than able to deal with the threat from multiple short- and medium-range missiles — a very real threat to our allies and some 80,000 American troops based in Europe that was not addressed by the previous plan. Even so, our military will continue research and development on a two-stage ground-based interceptor, the kind that was planned to be put in Poland, as a back-up.

Moreover, a fixed radar site like the one previously envisioned for the Czech Republic would be far less adaptable than the airborne, space- and ground-based sensors we now plan to use. These systems provide much more accurate data, offer more early warning and tracking options, and have stronger networking capacity — a key factor in any system that relies on partner countries. This system can also better use radars that are already operating across the globe, like updated cold war-era installations, our newer arrays based on high-powered X-band radar, allied systems and possibly even Russian radars.

One criticism of this plan is that we are relying too much on new intelligence holding that Iran is focusing more on short- and medium-range weapons and not progressing on intercontinental missiles. Having spent most of my career at the C.I.A., I am all too familiar with the pitfalls of over-reliance on intelligence assessments that can become outdated. As Gen. James Cartwright, the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said a few days ago, we would be surprised if the assessments did not change because “the enemy gets a vote.”

The new approach to European missile defense actually provides us with greater flexibility to adapt as new threats develop and old ones recede. For example, the new proposal provides some antimissile capacity very soon — a hedge against Iran’s managing to field missiles much earlier than had been previously predicted. The old plan offered nothing for almost a decade.

Those who say we are scrapping missile defense in Europe are either misinformed or misrepresenting what we are doing. This shift has even been distorted as some sort of concession to Russia, which has fiercely opposed the old plan. Russia’s attitude and possible reaction played no part in my recommendation to the president on this issue. Of course, considering Russia’s past hostility toward American missile defense in Europe, if Russia’s leaders embrace this plan, then that will be an unexpected — and welcome — change of policy on their part. But in any case the facts are clear: American missile defense on the continent will continue, and not just in Central Europe, the most likely location for future SM-3 sites, but, we hope, in other NATO countries as well.

This proposal is, simply put, a better way forward — as was recognized by Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland when he called it “a chance for strengthening Europe’s security.” It is a very real manifestation of our continued commitment to our NATO allies in Europe — iron-clad proof that the United States believes that the alliance must remain firm.

I am often characterized as “pragmatic.” I believe this is a very pragmatic proposal. I have found since taking this post that when it comes to missile defense, some hold a view bordering on theology that regards any change of plans or any cancellation of a program as abandonment or even breaking faith. I encountered this in the debate over the Defense Department’s budget for the fiscal year 2010 when I ended three programs: the airborne laser, the multiple-kill vehicle and the kinetic energy interceptor. All were plainly unworkable, prohibitively expensive and could never be practically deployed — but had nonetheless acquired a devoted following.

I have been a strong supporter of missile defense ever since President Ronald Reagan first proposed it in 1983. But I want to have real capacity as soon as possible, and to take maximum advantage of new technologies to combat future threats.

The bottom line is that there will be American missile defense in Europe to protect our troops there and our NATO allies. The new proposal provides needed capacity years earlier than the original plan, and will provide even more robust protection against longer-range threats on about the same timeline as the previous program. We are strengthening — not scrapping — missile defense in Europe.

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/20/opinio...anted=1&hp

Sounds good, but if this is better, why are the Eastern Europeans upset?

Remember, we sort of forced this thing on the Europeans in the beginning. IIRC, they were worried about the Russian reaction and were not particularly excited at first; now we're saying, "We crammed this down your throat, now spit it back out."

I don't have strong feelings one way or the other on this. I was opposed to putting them in at first, but now that we started down that road, the implications of changing may be more dangerous than staying the course. I tend to think that Gates and others in the administration have access to more data than I do, and therefore their opinion is more informed than mine. On the other hand, their point of view may be far more partisan than mine, too, so I'm not sure who wins in that trade-off.

I would hope that we got some serious concessions from the Russians in return. If we did, on balance it's probably a good thing.

But where are they going to base these sea-based interceptors so that they can be effective in getting something shot from Southwest Asia? The Black Sea seems to be about the only viable location I can think of - the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas are too far off to the side. But you think the Russians want us to have any sort of sophisticated interceptor technology - and the tracking equipment that has to support it - sitting in the Black Sea/Turkey? Similar concerns if they try to base it in the Baltic, which also seems just too late in the trajectory for being an effective location for intercepting ballistic missles.

I'm still trying to make sense of the feasibility of this one.

(09-21-2009 07:57 AM)gsloth Wrote:  I'm still trying to make sense of the feasibility of this one.

Me, too.

Who are we angering and who are we making happy? And why?

I don't completely trust gates on this - he isn't going to step out and "My boss is doing something stupid and/or dangerous" - so I want to see some assesments by independent sources.

In the end though, good or bad, it is a done deal. Hope it is for good.

(09-17-2009 06:06 PM)OptimisticOwl Wrote:  I don't like the idea of alienating our allies, to curry favor with Russia, but sometimes you have to choose one side or the other.

It is an open question as to how much this particular case really matters. But as a general rule: when it does matter, the kinds of countries we should side with are those which are democracies, and those which are our friends.

Admittedly, it takes discernment to figure out which countries really fall into one or both of those categories. But it is somewhat fair to say that Poland and Czechoslovakia may be both. And it is more than fair to say that Russia is neither.

I don't know whether I agree or not, but I wouldn't put this in the 10 biggest mistakes Obama has made...

maybe the 100 biggest, maybe...

(09-21-2009 07:57 AM)gsloth Wrote:  But where are they going to base these sea-based interceptors so that they can be effective in getting something shot from Southwest Asia? The Black Sea seems to be about the only viable location I can think of - the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas are too far off to the side. But you think the Russians want us to have any sort of sophisticated interceptor technology - and the tracking equipment that has to support it - sitting in the Black Sea/Turkey? Similar concerns if they try to base it in the Baltic, which also seems just too late in the trajectory for being an effective location for intercepting ballistic missles.

I'm still trying to make sense of the feasibility of this one.

The GBI's originally proposed for Eurpoe are the same ones that are in Alaska and California as part of our ABM system and are much more flexible than the options now proposed.

What is being offered is a combination of Patriot PAC-3's and a land based and sea based system derived from the US Navy's AEGIS SM-3 system. The AEGIS system works, and has been tested several times over the past few years. It even took down a malfunctioning US recon satellite last year. Its big limitation is range. Its a "point defense system" with limited lateral range since it was designed to protect US Carrier Battle Groups from incoming Chinese anti-carrier ballistic missiles basically coming "straight down" on ships.

Could it be modified for land based use? Sure. But you better have missiles close to each potential target.

(09-21-2009 08:10 PM)georgewebb Wrote:  

(09-17-2009 06:06 PM)OptimisticOwl Wrote:  I don't like the idea of alienating our allies, to curry favor with Russia, but sometimes you have to choose one side or the other.

But it is somewhat fair to say that Poland and Czechoslovakia may be both. And it is more than fair to say that Russia is neither.

Oops .. I meant Czech Republic. Old habits die hard. ("old" being relative -- it was only a few generations ago that the state of Czechoslovakia was created out of whole cloth, and its very name was considered a monstrosity to wags of the day...) But as the poet says:
Czechoslovakia's not
A republic these days—you forgot?
It's Slovakia and
Czech Republic; they planned
A Velvet Divorce (none were shot).

(09-21-2009 08:26 PM)Owl 69/70/75 Wrote:  I don't know whether I agree or not, but I wouldn't put this in the 10 biggest mistakes Obama has made...

maybe the 100 biggest, maybe...

Someday i would like to see this list...